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sumption of statutory compliance that arises when the warrant and
supporting affidavit are set out in the record.22  The decision is there-
fore proper. However, the court in citing the McLamb decision and
speaking of meeting the requirements of only G.S. § 18-13 could leave
the erroneous impression that there is still a distinction between the re-
quirements for obtaining a search warrant for illegally possessed liquor
and a search warrant for other statutory contraband. As we have
noted, since the enactment of G.S. § 15-27.1, there is no longer any such
distinction in the requirements for issuance of search warrants. It is
unfortunate that the court did not seize upon this opportunity to take
judicial notice of G.S. § 15-27.1, and it is hoped that on the court's
next opportunity it will recognize this legislative move toward greater
uniformity and thereby clear the muddy waters in this area.
JoiaN H. KERR, III
Criminal Procedure-Capital Offenses-Prosecution's Mention of
Death Penalty Before Jury as Error
Prior to 1949 a conviction of murder in the first degree in North
Carolina carried an automatic death penalty under the former version
of G.S. § 14-17.1 That year the General Assembly added a proviso
to the statute which stated that "if at the time of rendering its verdict in
open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be im-
prisonment for life ... and the court shall so instruct the jury.' 2
State v. Mclfillan3 was apparently the first case interpreting this
proviso. The trial judge had instructed the jury that they might recom-
mend life imprisonment if they felt justified in doing so under the facts
and circumstances of the case. A new trial was granted because the
2 State v. Rhodes, 233 N.C. 453, 64 S.E.2d 287 (1951) ; State v. Elder, 217 N.C.
111, 6 S.E.2d 840 (1940); cf. State v. McMilliam, 243 N.C. 771, 92 S.E.2d 202
(1956), where the State failed to produce a search warrant or render testimony
supporting its existence. The court ruled that the evidence obtained by the search
would not be introduced. "It might have been a general warrant, which is
'dangerous to liberty'." Id. at 773, 92 S.E.2d at 204.
"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, im-
prisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing, or ,Which' shall. be committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed
to be murder in the first degree and- shall be punished with death. All other kinds
of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree .... "N.C. Sess. Laws
1893, chs. 85, 281.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953). For the origin of the proviso see Report of
the Committee for Improvement of Justice, Popular Government, Jan. 1949, p. 13,
col. 3; Criminal Law, Survey of Statutory Changes, 27 N.C.L. Rxv. 449 (1950).
Provisos of like effect were'also added to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953) (rape),
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1953) (burglary) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953)(arson).
2233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E.2d 212 (1951).
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charge implied restrictions upon the jury's discretion unauthorized
by the statute. The court held that the proviso gave the jury an "un-
bridled discretionary right" 4 to recommend life imprisonment upon
finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder; that the right had
no conditions, qualifications or limitations imposed upon it; and that any
charge, instruction or suggestion by the court as to causes for which the
right should or should not be exercised was reversible error. Subse-
quent cases were in accord."
In State v. Dockery6 counsel for the private prosecution argued to
the jury: "There is no such thing as life imprisonment in North Caro-
lina today.' 7 Counsel explained that he had reference to the state's
liberal parole laws. This was held to be "an appeal calculated and
intended to induce members of the jury not to exercise the unbridled
discretionary right, given to them by law." s The court also stated that
such argument was improper in that it went outside the record. The
case left open the question what would be permissible argument ad-
dressed to the jury's discretion. The court seemed to imply that the
prosectuor in a capital case could not argue that the evidence did not
warrant a recommendation of life imprisonment.0
State v. Oakes'° and State v. Pughn seem to strengthen any implica-
tion of the Dockery case that a solicitor may not argue for the death
penalty. In both cases convictions were reversed because the trial
judge repeated to the jury the contention of the solicitor that they
should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without
a recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment for life. In
Oakes the judge quoted only the ultimate contention of the State.
However, in Pugh the judge went further and repeated the reasons the
State had given for withholding the recommendation. The charges of
both trial judges were held to be erroneous because they infringed on
the unbridled discretion of the jury as guaranteed by the proviso of
G.S. § 14-17.
One justice concurred in Pugh,12 pointing out that it was his im-
pression that a majority of the court felt that a solicitor had no right
I Id. at 633, 65 S.E.2d at 213.5 State v. Denny, 249 N.C. 114, 105 S.E.2d 446 (1958); State v. Cook, 245
N.C. 610, 96 S.E.2d 842 (1957); State v. Adams, 243 N.C. 290, 90 S.E.2d 383(1955) ; State v. Carter, 243 N.C. 106, 89 S.E.2d 789 (1955) ; State v. Connor, 241
N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584 (1954); State v. Simmons, 236 N.C. 340, 72 S.E2d 743(1952) ; State v. Simmons, 234 N.C. 290, 66 S.E.2d 897 (1951) ; State v. Marsh, 234
N.C. 101, 66 S.E.2d 684 (1951).
238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953).
'Id. at 226, 77 S.E.2d at 667.8 Id. at 227, 77 S.E.2d at 668.
'Ibid. See also Survey of the Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court-
Crimnal Procedure, 32 N.C.L. Rav. 438 (1954).
20249 N.C. 282, 106 S.E.2d 206 (1958).
1 250 N.C. 278, 108 S.E.2d 649 (1959).
"Id. at 280, 108 S.E.2d at 651.
[Vol. 38
1960] NOTES AND COMMENTS 283
to urge a jury to refuse to exercise their power to recommend life im-
prisonment in a capital case. This was the first opinion that said directly
what Dockery, Oakes and the majority opinion of Pugh seemed to say
indirectly, i.e., that the question of punishment could not be argued by
the State to the jury.
Two justices joined in a dissent in the Pugh case' 3 stating that the
jury should be allowed to hear proper argument based on the evidence
and a charge of the court fairly reviewing the contentions upon the
evidence and then should be allowed to exercise their discretion. They
pointed out that if, as the majority held, it was error for the judge to
review contentions of the State in regard to punishment, it would
follow that it would also be error for such contentions to be made by
the solicitor. They admitted that the jury had discretion, but con-
tended that the manner of its exercise should be governed by the evi-
dence,1 4 not mere whim or fancy. The dissent further stated that State
v. McMillan was erroneous and that the error should not be perpetuated,
thus seeming to assume that the majority holding was a necessary result
of the holding in McMillan.
State v. Manning'5 is the most recent development in the interpreta-
tion of G.S. §14-17. On voir dire examination the solicitor said: "As
far as the state is concerned the sole and only purpose of this trial is to
send the defendant . . . to his death in the gas chamber .... -16 The
prospective juror to whom the statement was made was discharged upon
defendant's motion. However, three other prospective jurors who had
heard the statement were seated on the jury after the judge instructed
them to "disabuse their minds" 17 of the remark. Defendant's motion
to discharge the whole panel was overruled by the trial court. There-
after the solicitor informed five prospective jurors that the state was
asking for the death penalty. Defendant's objections to these state-
ments were overruled. Upon the jury's returning a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree without a recommendation of life imprison-
ment, defendant appealed.
13 250 N.C. at 286, 108 S.E.2d at 655.
" In State v. Shackleford, 232 N.C. 299, 302, 59 S.E.2d 826, 827 (1950) the
court said that the proviso in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953) (rape) gave the
jury "the right on the evidence in the case to render a verdict of rape with
recommendation of life imprisonment." When placed in context, this statement
seems to lend little support to the view of the Pugh dissent. The court used the
quoted language in affirming the exclusion of evidence that defendant contended
had become relevant, because of the proviso, as bearing on punishment. Apparently
there have been no rape, arson, or burglary cases that turned on the point of jury
discretion.1251 N.C. 1, 110 S.E.2d 474 (1959).
"'Id. at 2, 110 S.E.2d at 475.
17 Ibid.
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The, controlling opinion in Manning' held that the trial court had
committed three reversible errors. First, the trial judge erred in failing
to sustain, the defendant's motion to dismiss the panel of jurors. The
statement by the solicitor that the only reason for the trial was to send
defendant to the gas chamber was held to violate the proviso in G.S.
§ 14-17 and to be so prejudicial to the defendant that merely telling the
panel to dismiss the remark from their minds could not remove the
prejudice. Second, the trial judge erred when he failed to sustain an
objection to the solicitor's statements to the five prospective jurors
that the State was asking for the death penalty. It was held, without
explanation, that to allow the statements would be "a manifest violation
of the proviso in G.S. § 14-17."'" The only authority cited was State
v. Carter2 0 which had held that a defendant indicted for drunken driving
%vas entitleA to an impartial judge and jury and a fair trial in an "atmos-
pher of judicialcalm." 2.' Third, the controlling opinion held that it was
error to refuse a manslaughter charge on the evidence in the case.
The concurring opinion in Manning22 stated that the remark that
the only purpose of ife trial was to send defendant to the gas chamber
was error because it implied erroneously that defendant had tendered
a plea of "guilty '(which, 'if accepted, would call for life imprisonment
uider G.S. § f 5-162. f) an1 that it'had'been refused by the court. While
the "oiniion" 'made no mention' of whether the statement violated the
pri6sb in G.S..§ "14-17, it agreed" with the controlling opinion that the
staterrient wxas 'such thkt an instruction by the judge could not cure its
prejudicial ,effet. *The concurring justices also agreed with the con-
frolling opinion 'that failure to give the requested manslaughter charge
wa's reversible error.
. The remainder of the concurring opinion was devoted, in effect, to
dissenting from the view of the controlling justices that it was error for
the solicitor to be allowed to tell prospective jurors that the State was
seeking the deathpenaly. .The concurring justices indicated in positive
languagethat in their opinion it would be permissible for a solicitor to
make such statements. They also pointed out that they thought "it
permissible for the court to state the ultimate contentions of the State
and of 'the defendant, namely, the, simple statement that the State
contends', the 'jury should not, and the defendant contends the jury
should, recommend life iimprisonment, but that it is not permissible for
1" In Manning there was no opinion in which a majority of the justices joined.
Three justices joined in the leading opinion, two concurred on grounds other than
the one here under discussion, one dissented, and one did not sit. Therefore, the
wvriter has used the term "cohitrolling opinion" in lieu of "majority opinion."
119 251 N.C. at 5, 110 S.E.2d at 477.
20233 N.C. 581, 65 S.E.2d 9 (1951).2 11 Id. at 583, 65 S.E.2d at 10.
22251 N.C. at 6, 110 S.E.2d at 477.
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the court to discuss or review the various reasons or arguments sub-
mitted by the State's counsel or by the defendant's counsel in support
of their respective ultimate contentions." 23 The concurring opinion
thereby expressly disapproved the result reached in Oakes, although
it did not go so far as to disapprove that reached in Pugh. Furthermore,
the opinion stated that while the jury's discretion is absolute or un-
bridled in the sense that there is no rule of law by which the jury is to
be guided in making its decision, "it does not follow that the State's
counsel and the defense counsel may not submit their respective con-
tentions for jury consideration.1 24
The Manning dissent 23 did not consider the initial statement made
by the solicitor nor did it mention the judge's refusal to give a man-
slaughter charge. As to the statements of the solicitor upon voir dire,
that the State was asking for the death penalty it expressed substantially
the same view as the concurring opinion, stressing that the proviso of
G.S. § 14-17 does not warrant the holding that a solicitor could not so
argue.20  The dissent also indicated that the proviso would not prohibit
argument for the death penalty. The dissenting justice warns that the
"erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the proviso in G.S. 14-17"-'
in the principal case and in Oakes and Pugh has the effect of abolishing
capital punishment to a large extent, if not completely, in North Carolina.
Conceding that the correct interpretation of the proviso in G.S.
§ 14-17 is that it gives the jury "unbridled discretion" in recommending
the life sentence, it does not seem to follow that urging the death penalty
places a "bridle" on the jury's discretion. If permitted, a solicitor could
make a very convincing argument in favor of the death penalty, but
the jury would not be bound thereby to bring in a verdict of guilty with
no recommendation. If the court were to tell the jury that it must
consider certain factors as conclusive in deciding whether to make the
recommendation or not, it would seem that then and only then would
their discretion be restricted in a legal sense. Even in the latter instance
the jury would not be bound to bring in a verdict without recommenda-
tion, because the death penalty can never be mandatory in North Caro-
28Id. at 7, 110 S.E.2d at 478.
2, Ibid.
" Id. at 8, 110 S.E.2d at 478.
" The reader will recall that the dissent in Pugh stated that an erroneous de-
cision in McMillan was responsible for the result reached by the majority in Pugh.
Text accompanying note 14 supra. In Manning, however, the dissenter (whojoined in the Pugh dissent) seems to have reasoned that McMillan does not require
the result reached by the controlling opinion. Quaere whether the inconsistency
reflects an acquiescence in McMillan on its facts by the dissenter since his dissent
in Pugqh.27251 N.C. at 10, 110 S.E.2d at 480.
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lina except when the jury in its discretion fails to recommend life im-
prisonment.
An argument can be made to the effect that since capital punishment
is still sanctioned in this state, it would seem to follow that the State
is entitled to a jury that would have no objecfion to capital punishment
under certain circumstances. If this be true, then it would seem to
follow that a solicitor should be allowed to examine prospective jurors in
order to determine whether or not they have any conscientious objec-
tions to inflicting capital punishment, in order to insure that the State
obtains such a jury. To the extent that Manning implies that the
State is not entitled to so question prospective jurors, it is submitted
that the case is inconsistent with North Carolina's provision for capital
punishment. Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion one
reasons that if the solicitor is permitted to so question prospective jurors,
he is'at the same time clearly implying that the State desires the jurors
to bring back a verdict requiring that the defendant be punished by
d~th. If it would be permissible for the solicitor to imply that the State
disires that the accused be so punished, it would seem anomalous to
disallow a direct statement to that effect.
Until 1949 the right of the prosecution to make inquiry on voir dire
as to a prospective juror's views on capital punishment was well estab-
lished by North Carolina case law.28  No case since the proviso was
added to G.S. § 14-17 has held or intimated that the challenge because
of objection to capital punishment is no longer available to the State,
unless it'be Manning. As late as 1954 the court gave tacit approval to
the use of the challenge.29 The overwhelming weight of authority in
this country holds that it is proper to ask a prospective juror if he would
have any conscientious scruples against capital punishment.8 0
The argument of the concurring and dissenting opinions of the
Manning case seems to be bolstered by the failure of the controlling
opinion to explain how words spoken by counsel can restrict jury dis-
cretion. Although authority from other jurisdictions with statutes sim-
ilar to G.S. § 14-17 has not been cited by the court, the weight of
2 See State v. Vick, 132 N.C. 995, 43 S.E. 626 (1903) ; State v. Bowman, 80
N.C. 432 (1879).2 State v. Canipe, 240 N.C. 60, 81 S.E.2d 173 (1954).
'0 See Johnson v. State, 203 Ala. 30, 81 So. 820 (1919) ; Bell v. State, 102 Ark.
530, 180 S.W. 186 (1915) ; People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940) ;
Swain v. State, 162 Ga. 777, 135 S.E. 186 (1926) ; People v. Winchester, 352 I1.
237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933) ; Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 11 N.E. 360 (1886) ;
Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1945) ; Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19(1881); State v. Comery, 78 N.H. 6, 95 Atl. 670 (1915); Commonwealth v.
Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938) ; State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d
801 (1942) ; State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 285 Pac. 803 (1930).
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authorityal allows the State to seek and argue for the death penalty,
sometimes even in a seemingly unfair manner.32
From the standpoint of pure justice, the result produced by the
controlling opinion in Manning may be justified under the present
method of handling capital cases. Under G.S. § 14-17 guilt and punish-
ment are determined in the same verdict. There is the possibility that
if the State seeks to enforce the law in its most extreme form, argument
that would not prejudice the defendant on the question of punishment
could be given too much weight in the determination of the initial ques-
tion of guilt.
Another possibility of prejudice to defendant on the issue of guilt
arises because the State's argument against the jury's recommending life
imprisonment would seem to force defendant to argue in the alternative
that he is not guilty, but that if he is found guilty the jury should recom-
mend life imprisonment. This objection is subject to the attack that in
many cases a party may be required to offer alternative arguments.
It might be pointed out, however, that in those cases the party's life
is not at stake. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the
gravity of death cases requires that they receive special treatment 'OL
review.3 3 It would seem that if capital defendants are entitled to special
considerations on appeal they also ought to be relieved of the task
of arguing these alternatives in the lower court.
In the opinion of the writer the statute cannot properly be interpreted
to deny argument by the State for the death penalty. Conceding that
such argument is permissible, the problem then is that the argument
concerning punishment may be prejudicial on the issue of guilt. A
system of double hearings was adopted in California 4 where a statute
similar to G.S. § 14-17 had been in effect. Under the system adopted,
" See Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940) ; House v. State,
192 Ark. 476, 92 S.W.2d 868 (1936); People v. Goodwin, 9 Cal. 2d 711, 72 P.2d
551 (1937) ; Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S.E. 201 (1930) ; Howell v. State,
102 Ohio St. 411, 131 N.E. 706 (1912) ; Acros v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 315, 29
S.W.2d 395 (1930).
" In Powell v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S.W.2d 279 (1938), and
State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va. 1, 20 S.E. 873 (1894), solicitors were allowed to argue
the possibility of parole as a reason for inflicting the death penalty. In State v.
Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1938), the argument that if defendant were
not put to death he might escape and "get even" with State's witnesses was allowed.
" In State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 228, 77 S.E.2d 664, 668 (1953), Denny, J.,
speaking for the court, said: "Except in death cases, however, a new trial will not
be granted because of improper argument of counsel, unless an exception thereto
has been timely entered and duly preserved."
"' CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 provides that "Evidence may be presented at the
further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the
crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation
or mitigation of the penalty. The determination of the penalty of life imprisonment
or death shall be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on
the evidence presented, and the penalty fixed shall be expressly stated in the
decision or verdict."
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the second hearing was held after a verdict of guilty had been returned,
to hear evidence bearing on what punishment the defendant should
receive. Before this system was adopted, the California court had held
that mitigating evidence was inadmissible as not pertaining to the issue
of guilt ;35 however, the court, in other cases, 36 had approved instructions
that the jury must find some mitigating circumstance in order to
recommend that the sentence be only life imprisonment. Obviously the
double hearing system eliminated the injustice to capital defendants re-
sulting from the combined effect of these decisions.
Though North Carolina has not experienced the same problem that
California faced, the adoption of a similar statute would eliminate the
possibility of argument for the death penalty prejudicing the defendant
on the issue of guilt. Under such a system defendant would no longer
have to present the inconsistent arguments that he is not guilty, but that
if he is found guilty a life sentence should be recommended. Under
this system counsel for both sides should be held rigidly to evidence and
argument thereon pertaining to the issue of guilt in the first phase of
trial. If defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, then there should
be a second hearing before the same jury on the question of punishment.
Evidence and argument could then be presented as to the character and
previous record of defendant, and facts and circumstances in aggrava-
tion or mitigation of the crime could be shown.37 The double hearing
concept seems to assume that the jury should be charged to consider the
evidence and to exercise their discretion thereon in determining whether
to inflict the death penalty or recommend life imprisonment. Jury dis-
cretion would still be present, but hearing evidence solely in regard to
the penalty, coupled with a charge from the judge to consider the evi-
dence, would tend to give the jury something more than mere whim as a
criterion for exercise of that discretion.38
" People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915).
"E.g., People v. Kolez, 23 Cal. 2d 670, 145 P.2d 580 (1944).
"Although there is no jury in a court martial, military procedure provides
that "after the court has announced findings of guilty, the prosecution and defense
may present appropriate matter to aid the court in determining the kind and
amount of punishment to be imposed." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 119 (1951). Note that the military system of double hearings is not lim-
ited to capital cases.
18 Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1099 (1953).
Note that the California statute, discussed supra note 35, assumes that existing
law would allow defendant to waive a jury in a capital case. Clearly no such
waiver could be made under existing North Carolina law. The California statute
further assumes an existing murder statute which specifies that the trier of fact
may recommend the alternative penalties of death or life imprisonment. In North
Carolina the jury, by the terms of G.S. § 14-17, is only permitted to recommend
life imprisonment. The absence of a recommendation by the jury requires the
judge to enter a death sentence. The proviso in G.S. § 14-17 requires the recom-
mendation to be made at the same time the verdict of guilty is rendered.
A system of double hearings would seem to accomplish the purposes outlined
[Vol. 38
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Regardless of the suggested legislation, it is submitted that the three-
justice controlling opinion in the Manning case should not be accepted
as definitive of the law in regard to the solicitor's telling prospective
jurors that the State will seek the death penalty. The other three justices
said that as long as North Carolina law permits capital punishment the
State is entitled to seek the death penalty. The seventh member of the
court expressed a similar view in his dissent in State v. Pugh,3 9 where he
stated his opposition to a holding "that counsel must not contaminate
the jury with any argument as to the bearing the evidence should have
on the recommendation. '4° Thus it would appear that in a case squarely
presenting the question four members of the court would uphold the
right of the State to ask the jury not to recommend life imprisonment
and to argue on this point to some extent. Such a holding would be
more in keeping with the present law that a defendant found guilty of
a capital crime must die unless the jury recommends otherwise. On
the other hand, the fact that in Manning five justices held it error for
the solicitor to say that the only reason for having the trial was to
put defendant to death demonstrates that, regardless of their views as
to whether G.S. § 14-17 would permit the State to argue for death, a
majority of the court would reverse where such argument becomes
prejudicial per se.41
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
Trial Practice-Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem
Argument to the Jury
In Ratner v. Arrington' a Florida Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge in a personal injury action had not abused his discretion in
allowing the use of the per diem argument as a measurement of pain and
suffering damages. The plaintiff's counsel had been permitted, over
objection, to use a placard in his closing argument on which were listed
various elements of plaintiff's damages, including an amount for pain
and suffering calculated at fifteen dollars per day for the length of his life
in the text whether defendant is allowed to waive the jury or not. However, since
G.S. § 14-17 seems to contemplate but one hearing, it would appear that the
adoption of the suggested system *ould require that G.S. § 14-17 be repealed and
that it be replaced with a statute allowing the jury to recommend alternative pun-
ishments. The new murder statute could provide for double hearings, or a
separate section could be enacted to accomplish the purpose.
311250 N.C. at 286, 108 S.E.2d at 655.40 250 N.C. at 289, 108 S.E.2d at 657.
"' "Prejudicial per se" is used in the text to distinguish between the types of
prejudice that the court has traditionally recognized as grounds for a new trial, and
the "possibility of prejudice" suggested by the writer as inherent in the present
single-hearing system of trial in capital cases.
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
